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Does Democracy Increase Bilateral Trade in MENA Region? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to analyze the effects of democracy to the trade of countries in MENA Regions. 
The Gravity Model used to test the effects of democracy on trade. Estimation is done with 
several models, that is FE, RE, MLE, and PPML. From this estimation can be detected 
endogenity problem that is caused by simultaneity between export and democracy. The FE 
model with the infant mortality rate as instrumental variable was chosen to address the problem. 
After controlling endogenity, it can be concluded that democracy positively affects (3-4 per 
cent) of trade in MENA Regions, especially democracy in partner countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Scientists and policy makers believe that democracy will bring prosperity through 
global integration that enhances international trade (Balding, 2011). Democracy can affect 
trade through two ways, that is exports and imports. Democratization in exporting countries 
can improve product quality, lower trade costs, and increase bilateral trade. Hence, 
democratization in the country can increase trade barriers so as to decrease imports (Bu, 2010). 
Since 1960, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been the second or 
the second most undemocratic region. In terms of political inclusiveness, the most of countries 
in the MENA region have low (exclusive) political inclusiveness and only a small proportion 
have good policy coordination (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and Tunisia). Only Iran is 
politically inclusive with good policy coordination (Ross, ET AL., 2011). The democratization 
process in this region is not easy because of religious and cultural factors (Diamond, 2010). 
One of the causes of the slow progress toward democracy (from autocracy) in MENA Regions 
is the large number of countries that have oil wealth. The oil-rich countries tend to have lower 
social civilization than the oil-poor countries. Oil wealth in an undemocratic country tends to 
reduce social freedom of society. Oil wealth has a tendency to increase the risk of conflict in a 
country, especially if the income of the community is relatively low. The number of conflicts 
in the MENA region increased in trend from 1946 to 1992, then decreased until 2003, and again 
increased (Ross, ET AL., 2011). 
According to several literature studies, the performance of trade of MENA Regions is 
not as expected (Diop, ET AL., 2010; Gourdon, 2010; Behar and Freund, 2010; Rouis and 
Tabor, 2013). In 2005 to 2007, Behar and Freund (2011) conducted an analysis of trade 
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openness in the MENA Zone. The trade-to-GDP ratio of countries in the MENA region is lower 
than other regions of the world. Only the South Asian Region as well as Latin America and 
Caribea have a lower trade-to-GDP ratio than MENA Regions. Overall, trade openness in the 
MENA Region is still above the world average but becomes lower if oil or natural resources to 
be removed from the calculation (Behar and Freund, 2011). 
Countries in the MENA region tend to have high political conflicts. The majority of 
countries have low levels of democracy, that is between open autocracy to full autocracy (no 
democracy). The constitution and the head of state also vary, from the republic to the absolute 
monarchy to the head of the executive and ceremonial countries. These things cause the process 
of democratization in the MENA Region to be not easy. The trade characteristic of countries 
in the MENA region has not been established, the proportions of trade to GDP are low 
compared to other regions, have a trend that tends to be positive, growth fluctuates, and is still 
below its potential. Countries with abundant natural resources have better trade performance.  
Mansfield's, et al. (2000), Duc, et al. (2005), Decker and Lim (2009), Khan and Hossain 
(2010), Yu (2010), and Balding (2011) showed that democracy positively affects the flow of 
trade. On the other hand, Kono (2006) and Kono (2008) show that democracy affects trade 
policy.The aim of this paper is to examine the influence of democracy to the trade of countries 
in MENA Regions. 
 
2. LITERATUR REVIEW 
Political institutions have an important role in the economy. Both economic institutions 
and political institutions have a direct impact on outcomes in the economy (Acemoglu, 2009). 
Political institutions can be in direct democracy, representative democracy, and non-
democracy. In direct democracy, the key to decision-making lies in the majority of voting. In 
representative democracies voters elect representatives who then take political options with 
consequences to be downgraded if their policies are not in accordance with the wishes of the 
electorate. On the other hand a non democratic regime (dictator or autocracy), a small group of 
people play a key role (Acemoglu, 2009). An important distinction between democracy and 
autocracy is the legislative existence that de jure and de facto have the power to endorse the 
proposed chief executive of a democratic country. In an autocratic state, there are only 
executives as sole actors who must maintain political support, including consumer and 
corporate support affecting economic conditions. The choice of trade policy in an autocratic 
state tends to focus on its executive leader (Mansfield, et al., 2000). The Democratic trade flow 
is greater than the mixed state and autocracy (Cindy, et al., 2004). 
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Democracy is one type of political institutions that affect trade barriers. Mansfield, et 
al., (2000) modeled how politicians' preference influenced trade barriers. The model yields two 
hypotheses. First, trade barriers in aggregate will be lower between two democracies than the 
democratic state with autocracy. Second, the level of aggregate trade barriers will be higher 
between two autocratic states than with the two democracies or mixed couples, depending on 
their relative trade preference. 
Some studies suggest that democracy has a positive influence on international trade 
(Mansfield, et al., 2000; Cindy, et al., 2004; Balding, 2011; Decker and Lim, 2009; and Yu, 
2010). Political institutions affect the flow of bilateral trade by (Cindy, et al., 2004): (1) 
democracy countries will more easily negotiate trade agreements; (2) democracy countries will 
tend to set lower tariffs with trading partners whose transaction costs are low; (3) and 
transaction costs will be lower if each country that trades is low democracy. 
Yu (2010) states that democracy impacts trade costs through: (1) for exporters impact 
on institutional improvement, product quality, and enhancement of international trust in the 
pitching of its products; and (2) for importers impact on tariff reduction. 
Balding (2011) argues that political freedom is highly likely to be closely correlated 
with economic freedom which has an impact on increasing economic activity and democracy 
has implications for improving governance quality through institutional and policy-setting 
procedures. Democratic political institution will increase trade flow and tends to reduce trade 
barriers. Anderson and Nincompoop (2004) stated that trade costs are due to policies (tariffs, 
quotas) and environments (transportation costs as well as large and retail distribution costs). 
Democracy will affect the cost / trade barrier. The causality can be developed into Equation 1: 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑖
+, 𝑦𝑗
+, 𝑑𝑖𝑗
− , 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚𝒊𝒋
+ , 𝑝𝑖
−, 𝑝𝑗
−, … ).......(1). 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. DATA 
This study focused on 16 MENA countries, that is Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Jordan (resource poor – labor abundance); Algeria, Iran, Syria, Yemen (resource rich – labor 
abundance); and Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (resource rich – labor importing) from 1988 to 2015. Djibouti, Iraq and Israel / 
Palestine were excluded from observations due to the lack of available data. The bilateral trade 
partners included in the observations are 16 countries in the MENA Region and important 
trading partners outside the MENA, that is United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and 
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Germany. The pattern of trade is analyzed in five years while the Gravity Model is analyzed 
annually. 
This study uses secondary data sourced from United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (UN-Comtrade), Direction of Trades-International Monetary Fund (DOTS-
IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Development Report- World Bank (WDI-
WB ), CIA's World Facebook. 
 
3.2. GRAVITY MODEL 
To measure the effect of democracy to trade performance, democracy index (Yu, 2010, 
Balding, 2011) as a proxy variable of democracy is used. Equation 2 uses the democratic index 
as a proxy for democratic variables. 
ln(𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽5 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗)
+ 𝛽6 ln(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7 ln(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽8ln⁡(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑂𝑃𝑡⁡+⁡𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗⁡ + 𝛽14𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽16𝐼𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 …(2) 
where i is the home country, j is a partner country, and t is the year. Balding (2011) argues that 
democracy is not strong enough proxy for political institutions, so it needs to add other 
institutional control variables. Yu (2010) uses institutional quality as an institutional control 
variable (beyond the state characteristic control variables). According to these studies, this 
study uses governmental index variables (IGOV) as the institutional control variable.  
To anticipate endogenity that caused by simultanity on democracy variables, Yu (2010) 
and Balding (2011) used instrument variables on democracy index variables. An instrument 
variable which correlated with the instrumented variable and not correlated with the error is 
required (Wooldridge, 2013). Yu (2010) used variable infant mortality rate in a country as an 
instrument variable of the democracy index. To control endogenity (caused by the 
simultaneous) of democracy index variable, this study uses infant death ratio (IDR) as 
instrument variables on democracy variable. Equation 3 shows a reduced form of infant 
mortality rate as an instrument  democracy variable. 
𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿 + 𝛼0𝐼𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼2 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼3 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼4 ln(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛼5 ln(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼6ln⁡(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑂𝑃𝑡⁡+⁡𝛼9𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛼10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼11𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗⁡ + 𝛼12𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛼13𝐼𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼14𝐼𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼15𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 …(3) 
Table 1 about here 
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According to the literature review, the estimation begins with applying the Fixed Effect 
Model with Instrumental Variable. Model adjustment is performed if the model is not eligible 
to apply. The robbustness test is performed by comparing the various models and estimators. 
The sign consistency test is done by estimating the data as whole,  divided by country group 
(resource poor – labor abundant, resource rich – labor abundant, and resource rich – labor 
importing), and divied by  year period (1988 - 1994, 1995 - 2001, 2002 - 2008, and 2009 - 
2015). Table 1 describes the operational definition of regression variables used to see the effect 
of democracy on trade flows. 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Since 1960, MENA was one of the  most undemocratic region in the world. In terms of 
political inclusiveness, almost all countries in the MENA region have low (exclusive) political 
inclusiveness and only a small proportion have good policy coordination (Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Oman and Tunisia). Only Iran has politically inclusive with good policy coordination 
(Ross, et al., 2011). Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 show the progress of democracies index in 
MENA Countries based on Poly IV Indexes that classified based on the abundance of input 
sources from 1988 to 2015. Polity IV measures democracy based on executive recruitment 
(unregulated, transitional, regulated) , freedom from executive authority (transitional selection, 
election), as well as political competition and opposition (closed, double-selection, double-
elect, executive executives). The Polity IV Index has a range of values between -10 (full 
autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). Negative numbers can be interpreted autocracy while 
positively interpreted democracy. 
Table 2 about here 
In resource poor  - labor abundant countries, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco tend to be in 
autocracy. Lebanon tends to be democratic while Tunisia proceeds from autocracy to 
democracy. Within 28 years, countries with the higher mean democracy index are Lebanon, 
Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt and Morocco. The average trend of democracy index has increased (see 
Table 2). 
In resource-rich – labor abundant countries, Syria tends to perfect autocracy. Algeria 
has been proceeding from autocracy to democracy. Iran and Yemen fluctuate from autocracy 
to democracy, and back to autocracy. Within 28 years, countries that have higher average index 
are Yemen, Iran, and Syria. The average trend of democracy index has increased (see Table 2). 
In resource rich -  labor importing countries, all countries tend to close perfect autocracy 
(less than -5), even for Qatar and Saudi Arabia for 28 years perfect autocracy. Libya is a country 
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with the lowest level of autocracy, even ever democracy (zero). Resource rich -  labor importing 
countries tend to be more autocratic than the others. Within 28 years, countries with the highest 
mean democracy index are Libya, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia respectively. The average trend of democracy index has increased (Table 2). 
From these tables can be concluded that the trend of democracy index in all groups of 
countries has increased with the highest average in the group of resource poor countries - 
abundant labor countries, the group of resource poor – labor abundant countries. 
Table 3 about here 
Table 3 shows the results of regression  with export as dependent variable.  The 
estimations use several models, that is  Fixed Effect/FE (Duc, et al, 2005; Decker and Lim, 
2009; Yu, 2010; and Balding, 2011), Random Effect/RE (Decker and Lim, 2009), and Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood/PPML (Yu, 2010). Maximum Likelihood Estimation/MLE is 
also used to test robustness of model. 
Simultaneusly, it can be argued that all independent variables can explain changes in 
export values. This is indicated by the value of F (for FE) or Wald Chi2 (for RE) which is much 
higher than the critical value for 99 percent level of confidence. All R2 value are greater than 
0.5. The chi square value of Hausman's Test (50.59 with probability 0,000) shows that  FE 
Model is preferred than RE Model with 99 percent level of confidence. 
For the main variable of Gravity Model, GDP of home country and partner country 
have positive and significant effect, while the distance has negative and significant effect to 
export. This fact is in line with the model developed by Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963), 
and Linnemann (1966). 
Beside the main variables, control variables are included to address endogenous issues. 
These variables and their relationships are the population of home country (positive and 
significant), the population of partner country (positive and significant), the area of home 
country (negative and significant), the exchange rate with the partner country (negative and 
significant ), world oil prices (positive and significant), colonized after 1945 (negative and 
significant), colonized by the same country (positive and significant), linguistic similarities 
(positive and significant), global economic crisis in 2008 (negative and significant), 
governance index of home country (positive and significant), and governance index of partner 
country (positive and significant). Variable of  area of home country is removed from the FE 
model (automatically by the software) due to the col linearity problem. For all models, the 
destination country's democratic index has a positive and significant effect on trade with a 99 
percent level of confidence. 
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There is a different results for democratic index of home country. It has a positive and 
significant effect on the FE Model,  negative and significant on the RE and PPML Model. Only 
the FE Model gives the results that consistent with the theory. This fact indicates endogenous 
that caused by simultaneity in  variable of democratic index in  home country, so that the model 
with the instrument variables becomes an alternative to be estimated (Yu, 2010 and Balding, 
2011). 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results with the FE and RE models, either using the 
instrument variables or not. As Yu (2010), the instrument variable used in this model is the 
infant mortality rate (in percent). Conceptually, infant mortality rates are positively correlated 
with democracy (the better the political / democratic order the smaller infant mortality, 
especially due to the conflict) and not correlated with trade (exports). 
Table 4 about here 
Simultaneusly, it can be argued that all independent variables can explain changes in 
export values. This is indicated by the value of F (for FE) or Wald Chi2 (for RE) which is much 
higher than the critical value for 99 percent level of confidence. All R2 value are greater than 
0.5. The chi square value of Hausman's Test (50.59 with probability 0,000) shows that  FE 
Model is preferred than RE Model with 99 percent degree of freedom. 
To test the infant mortality rate as an instrument variable, three tests were used, that is 
Anderson Cannonical Correlation LM Test, Cragg-Donald Wald F Test, and Sargan Test. The 
significant of Anderson Cannonical Correlation LM score at 99 percent level of confidence 
indicates that the under identification hypothesis of the equation is rejected. The significant 
value of Cragg-Donald Wald F at  90 percent level of confidence indicates that the weak 
identical hypothesis of the equation is rejected. The near-zero Sargan value indicates that the 
infant mortality rate as a valid instance is not rejected. From these results can be concluded that 
the infant mortality rate is quite feasible to be used as instrument variable. 
For the main variable of Gravity Model, GDP of home country and partner country 
have positive and significant effect, while the distance has negative and significant effect to 
export. This fact is in line with the model developed by Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963), 
and Linnemann (1966). 
Like Table 3, country characteristic control variables are included to address 
endogenous problems. These variables and their relationships are the population of home 
country (positive and significant), the population of partner country (positive and significant), 
the area home country (negative and significant), exchange rate (negative and significant ), 
world oil prices (positive and significant), ever colonized after 1945 (negative and significant), 
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ever colonized by the same country (positive and significant), linguistic similarities (positive 
and significant), global economic crisis period in 2008 (negative and significant), government 
index of home country (positive and significant), and Vermont index of partner country 
(positive and significant). The variable the area of home country removed from the FE model 
(automatically by the software) due to the collinearity problem. 
For all models, the partner country's democratic index has a positive and significant 
effect on trade with a 99 percent level of confidence. There is a different results for the 
democratic index of the home country. Original democracy index has positive effect on FE (not 
significant) and FE + IV (not significant) model, RE + IV model (significant), and has negative 
and insignificant effect on RE Model. The FE model gives a consistent sign with the (positive) 
theories, both with and without instrument variables. Models with IV (both FE and RE) provide 
the results that are most consistent with the theory. These results indicate simultaneity in the 
democratic index of the home country, so that the model with the instrument variables becomes 
relevant for use. The estimation results in Table 5 show that the effect of democracy in home 
country seems unstable. 
To test the consistency of the effect of these variables, similar estimation (FE with IV) 
are both classified by group of countries based on the resources they have (Table 5) and time 
period (Table 6). 
Table 5 about here 
Table 5 shows that the effect of democracy in home country is only positive and 
significant in resource rich – labor importing countries. The effect of democracy in resource 
poor – labor abundant countries (positive) and resource rich – labor abundant countries 
(negative) is not statistically significant. While the effect of democracy in partner country 
remains positive and significant in all three groups. These analyzes support that the effect of 
partner country democracy on MENA’s trade (positive and significant) is more dominant the 
democracy of reporting country. 
Table 6 about here 
Another way to test the consistency of democratic index variables is to compare 
estimation with the entire period (28 years) with the seven-year period (1988 - 1995, 1995 - 
2001, 2002 - 2008, and 2009 - 2015) as summarized in Table 6. This table shows that the effect 
of democracy in home country are positive but not significant during the period of 1988 - 1994 
and 2002 - 2008 and negative and significant during 1995 - 2001 and 2008 - 2015 period. The 
effects of democracy in partner country are positive for all periods. These analyzes support that 
the effect of partner country democracy on MENA’s trade (positive not significant and positive 
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significant) is more dominant than democracy of home country country. The effect of partner 
country democracy is consistent across times while in the effect of home country democracy 
is inconsistent. Balding (2011) stated that there is an income effect on the effect of democracy 
on trade. All of resource rich – labor importing countries which have a positive democracy 
effect on trade are high level income countries. It supports Linder (1961) and Rose (2004) who 
stated that countries with higher income levels tend to have higer level of international trade. 
Governance quality also plays important role (both positive significant for home and partner 
countries) on trade. Paldam (2003), De Haan and Sturn (2003) stated that the positive effect of 
democracy on trade has indirect effect through economic freedom and quality of governance. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
For all results, the Gravity Model is a good model for explaining the variables affecting 
trade (exports). It can be seen from R2 values that greater than 0.55 for the entire observation 
(8.960). Simultaneously, all explanatory variables explain bilateral trade (exports). For the 
main gravity variable, GDP of home country and partner country have positive and significant 
effect, while the distance has negative and significant effect to export. This fact is in line with 
the model developed by Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963), and Linnemann (1966). 
Meanwhile, country characteristic (control) variables and their relationships are the population 
of home country (positive and significant), the copulation of partner country (positive and 
significant), the area of origin country (negative and significant), exchange rate (negative and 
significant ), world oil prices (positive and significant), ever colonized by the same country 
(positive and significant), language similarity (positive and significant), and period of global 
economic crisis in 2008 (negative and significant). Governance index of home country 
(positive and significant), and governance index of partner country (positive and significant). 
Only variables of ever colonized after 1945 which has an inconsistent sign (negative and 
significant). 
Estimation is done with several models, that is FE, RE, MLE, and PPML. From this 
estimation can be detected endogenity problem that is caused by simultaneity between export 
and democracy. The FE model with the infant mortality rate as instrumental variable was 
chosen to address the problem. Democracy has a positive effect on trade in MENA Region, 
with dominant effect on partner country than home country. These result supports Yu (2010) 
and Balding (2011) that uses democracy and their results showed that democracy has a positive 
effect on trade flow. After providing control variables to endogenity (simultaneity and 
additional control variables for government institutions) it can be concluded that democracy 
11 
 
positively affects trade in MENA Regions, especially democracy in destination countries. 
Democracy contributes to trade increase by 3 - 4 percent. 
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7. APPENDIX 
Table 1 Variable Definitions 
Notation Meaning Variable Definition Unit Source 
Exijt Bilateral Trade  Bilateral trade (export) from 
country i to country j, years t. 
US$ UN-
Comtrade 
GDPit Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
GDP country i, years t US$ WDI-WB 
GDPjt Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
GDP country j, years t US$ WDI-WB 
Distij Distance Distance between coutry i and 
country j. 
km CEPII Data 
set 
POPit Population Population number of country 
i, year t. 
Person WDI-WB 
POPjt Population Population number of country 
j, year t. 
Person WDI-WB 
Areai Area Area of country i. Km2 CEPII 
Dataset 
ERijt Exchange Rate Exchange rate between 
country i and j. 
Abroad 
value/home 
value 
WDI-WB 
OPt Oil Price World crude oil price. $/bbl WDI-WB 
Colij Colonony Binary variable, 1 = pairs 
ever in colonial relationship, 
0 = others. 
- CEPII 
Dataset 
Comcolij Common Colony Binary variable, 1 = common 
colonizer post 1945, 0 = 
others. 
- CEPII 
Dataset 
Langij Language Binary variable, 1 = common 
language, 0 = others. 
- CEPII 
Dataset 
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Notation Meaning Variable Definition Unit Source 
GFCt Global 
Financial Crisis 
Binary variable, 1 = 2008 and 
after, 0 = others. 
-  
IGovit Government 
Index 
Government effectiveness of 
country i. 
- WGI-WB 
IGovjt Government 
Index 
Government effectiveness 
index of country j year t. 
- WGI-WB  
IDRit Infant Death 
Ratio 
Government effectiveness 
index of country i year t. 
% WDI-WB 
IDemit Democracy 
Index 
Democracy index of country 
i, year t. 
- Polity IV 
Dataset 
IDemjt Democracy 
Index 
Democracy index of country 
j, year t. 
 - Polity IV 
Dataset 
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Table 2. Democracy Index of Countries in MENA Region 
   Year 
Resource Poor – Labor Abundance Countries Resource Rich – Labor Abundance Countries Resource Poor – Labor Importing Countries 
Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Average Algeria Iran Syria Yemen Average Bahrain Kuwait Libya Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Average 
1988 -6 -9 0 -8 -5 -5.6 -9 -6 -9 -6 -7.5 -10 -10 -7 -10 -10 -10 -8 -9.29 
1989 -6 -4 0 -8 -5 -4.6 -2 -6 -9 -5 -5.5 -10 -10 -7 -10 -10 -10 -8 -9.29 
1990 -6 -4 0 -8 -5 -4.6 -2 -6 -9 -5 -5.5 -10 -9 -7 -10 -10 -10 -8 -9.14 
1991 -6 -4 0 -8 -5 -4.6 -2 -6 -9 -4 -5.25 -10 -9 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -9 
1992 -6 -2 0 -7 -5 -4 -7 -6 -9 -3 -6.25 -10 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.71 
1993 -6 -2 0 -7 -3 -3.6 -7 -6 -9 -2 -6 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
1994 -6 -2 0 -7 -3 -3.6 -7 -6 -9 -2 -6 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
1995 -6 -2 0 -7 -3 -3.6 -3 -6 -9 -2 -5 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
1996 -6 -2 0 -7 -3 -3.6 -3 -6 -9 -2 -5 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
1997 -6 -2 0 -7 -3 -3.6 -3 3 -9 -2 -2.75 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
1998 -6 -2 0 -6 -3 -3.4 -3 3 -9 -2 -2.75 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
1999 -6 -2 0 -6 -3 -3.4 -3 3 -9 -2 -2.75 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
2000 -6 -2 0 -6 -3 -3.4 -3 3 -7 -2 -2.25 -9 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.57 
2001 -6 -2 0 -6 -3 -3.4 -3 3 -7 -2 -2.25 -8 -7 -7 -9 -10 -10 -8 -8.43 
2002 -6 -2 0 -6 -4 -3.6 -3 3 -7 -2 -2.25 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2003 -6 -2 0 -6 -4 -3.6 -3 3 -7 -2 -2.25 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2004 -6 -2 0 -6 -4 -3.6 2 -6 -7 -2 -3.25 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2005 -3 -2 6 -6 -4 -1.8 2 -6 -7 -2 -3.25 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2006 -3 -2 6 -6 -4 -1.8 2 -6 -7 -2 -3.25 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2007 -3 -3 6 -6 -4 -2 2 -6 -7 -2 -3.25 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2008 -3 -3 6 -6 -4 -2 2 -6 -7 -2 -3.25 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2009 -3 -3 6 -6 -4 -2 2 -7 -7 -2 -3.5 -7 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -8.14 
2010 -3 -3 6 -6 -4 -2 2 -7 -7 -2 -3.5 -5 -7 -7 -8 -10 -10 -8 -7.86 
2011 -2 -3 6 -4 4 0.2 2 -7 -7 -2 -3.5 -8 -7 0 -8 -10 -10 -8 -7.29 
2012 -3 -3 6 -4 5 0.2 2 -7 -9 3 -2.75 -10 -7 0 -8 -10 -10 -8 -7.57 
2013 -4 -3 6 -4 6 0.2 2 -7 -9 3 -2.75 -10 -7 0 -8 -10 -10 -8 -7.57 
2014 -4 -3 6 -4 7 0.4 2 -7 -9 0 -3.5 -10 -7 0 -8 -10 -10 -8 -7.57 
2015 -4 -3 6 -4 7 0.4 2 -7 -9 0 -3.5 -10 -7 0 -8 -10 -10 -8 -7.57 
Average -4.89 -2.79 2.36 -6.14 -2.11 -2.71 -1.39 -4 -8.14 -1.96 -3.88 -8.54 -7.36 -5.75 -8.61 -10 -10 -8 -8.32 
 Source: Polity IV, calculated.
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Tabel 3 Effect of Democracy on Export in MENA Region (Non IV) 
Variable 
LEXij / Coefficient (Standard Error) 
FE RE MLE PPML 
Democracy  
IDEMi 0.0014 
(0.0093) 
-0.0030 
(0.0090) 
-0.0001 
(0.0092) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0003) 
IDEMj 0.0402*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0417*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0405*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0030*** 
(0.0003) 
Gravity  
LGDPi 1.0268*** 
(0.1217) 
1.1060*** 
(0.0802) 
1.0809*** 
(0.1082) 
0.0480*** 
(0.0017) 
LGDPj 0.6688*** 
(0.0200) 
0.6778*** 
(0.0200) 
0.6708*** 
(0.0200) 
0.0424*** 
(0.0012) 
LDISTij -1.6162*** 
(0.0257) 
-1.6180*** 
(0.0257) 
-1.6167*** 
(0.0256) 
-0.0978*** 
(0.0015) 
Country 
Characteristics 
 
LPOPi 1.0493*** 
(0.1459) 
0.6663*** 
(0.0923) 
0.1943*** 
(0.1335) 
0.0219*** 
(0.0018) 
LPOPj 0.2794*** 
(0.0211) 
0.2756*** 
(0.0211) 
0.2785*** 
(0.0211) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0014) 
LAREAi - -0.4353*** 
(0.0593) 
-0.5668*** 
(0.1134) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0010) 
ERij -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
OP 0.0074*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0077*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
COLij -0.4020*** 
(0.1100) 
-0.4183*** 
(0.1102) 
-0.4057*** 
(0.1098) 
-0.0360*** 
(0.0056) 
COMCOLij 0.5218*** 
(0.0613) 
0.5275*** 
(0.0614) 
0.5234*** 
(0.0613) 
0.0249*** 
(0.0032) 
LANGij 0.8970*** 
(0.0650) 
0.9329*** 
(0.0648) 
0.9047*** 
(0.0649) 
0.0699*** 
(0.0036) 
GFC -0.2364*** 
(0.0758) 
-0.1877** 
(0.0756) 
-0.2231*** 
(0.0757) 
-0.0076*** 
(0.0043) 
IGOVi 0.1022* 
(0.0614) 
0.1996*** 
(0.0584) 
0.1259** 
(0.0612) 
0.0392*** 
(0.0021) 
IGOVj 0.3232*** 
(0.0299) 
0.3138*** 
(0.2998) 
0.3211*** 
(0.0299) 
0.0155*** 
(0.0019) 
C -35.6513*** 
(2.0175) 
-26.5612*** 
(1.6079) 
-28.0912*** 
(2.1488) 
0.6735*** 
(2.1488) 
 
N 8,960 8,960 8,960 8,960 
F / Wald Chi2 / 
LR Chi2 
737.16*** 11,021.87*** 7,210.42*** - 
R2 / R2 within 0.5532 0.5526 - 0.5672 
         Source: UN-Comtrade, WDI-World Bank, CEPII, Polity IV, calculated. * Significant at 
α=10%, ** significant at α=5%, *** significant at α=1% 
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Tabel 4 Effect of Democracy on Export in MENA Region (IV and Non IV) 
Variable 
LEXij / Coefficient (Standard of Error) 
FE RE FE + IV RE + IV 
Democracy  
IDEMi 0.0014 
(0.0093) 
-0.0030 
(0.0090) 
0.0378 
(0.0454) 
0.0922** 
(0.0420) 
IDEMj 0.0402*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0417*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0340*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0410*** 
(0.0041) 
Gravity  
LGDPi 1.0268*** 
(0.1217) 
1.1060*** 
(0.0802) 
1.0034*** 
(0.1251) 
1.2111*** 
(0.0926) 
LGDPj 0.6688*** 
(0.0200) 
0.6778*** 
(0.0200) 
0.6667*** 
(0.0202) 
0.6713*** 
(0.0204) 
LDISTij -1.6162*** 
(0.0257) 
-1.6180*** 
(0.0257) 
-1.6161*** 
(0.0257) 
-1.6177*** 
(0.0259) 
Country Characteristics  
LPOPi 1.0493*** 
(0.1459) 
0.6663*** 
(0.0923) 
1.0760*** 
(0.1497) 
0.5553*** 
(0.1043) 
LPOPj 0.2794*** 
(0.0211) 
0.2756*** 
(0.0211) 
0.2800*** 
(0.0211) 
0.2774*** 
(0.0213) 
LAREAi - -0.4353*** 
(0.0593) 
- -0.4111*** 
(0.0606) 
ERij -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
OP 0.0074*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0089*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0068*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0015) 
COLij -0.4020*** 
(0.1100) 
-0.4183*** 
(0.1102) 
-0.4005*** 
(0.1100) 
-0.4151*** 
(0.1109) 
COMCOLij 0.5218*** 
(0.0613) 
0.5275*** 
(0.0614) 
0.5224*** 
(0.0614) 
0.5308*** 
(0.0618) 
LANGij 0.8970*** 
(0.0650) 
0.9329*** 
(0.0648) 
0.8925*** 
(0.0653) 
0.9175*** 
(0.0655) 
GFC -0.2364*** 
(0.0758) 
-0.1877** 
(0.0756) 
-0.2455*** 
(0.0767) 
-0.2083*** 
(0.0765) 
IGOVi 0.1022* 
(0.0614) 
0.1996*** 
(0.0584) 
0.1304*** 
(0.0711) 
0.2890*** 
(0.0703) 
IGOVj 0.3232*** 
(0.0299) 
0.3138*** 
(0.2998) 
0.3266*** 
(0.0302) 
0.3240*** 
(0.0305) 
C -35.6513*** 
(2.0175) 
-26.5612*** 
(1.6079) 
-35.2212*** 
(2.0868) 
-26.9482*** 
(1.6262) 
 
N 8,960 8,960 8,960 8,960 
F / Wald Chi2  737.16*** 11,021.87*** 891,846.81*** 10,998.31*** 
R2 within 0.5532 0.5526 0.5525 0.5476 
Anderson CC- LM Stat. - 376.10*** 663.23*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat. - 391.95* 715* 
Sargan Stat. - 0.000 0.000 
Source: UN-Comtrade, WDI-World Bank, CEPII, Polity IV, calculated. * significant at 
α=10%, ** significant at α=5%, *** significant at α=1% 
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Tabel 5 Effect of Democracy on Export in MENA Region (Classified by Resource) 
Variable 
LEXij / Coefficient (Standard of Error) 
Total 
Resource Poor – 
Labor Abundance 
Resource Rich – 
Labor Abundance 
Resource Rich – 
Labor Importing 
Democracy  
IDEMi 0.0378 
(0.0454) 
3.5598 
(3.6547) 
-0.1087 
(0.1548) 
0.7684*** 
(0.1697) 
IDEMj 0.0340*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0247 
(0.0290) 
0.0841*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0315*** 
(0.0075) 
Gravitasi  
LGDPi 1.0034*** 
(0.1251) 
-3.6514 
(4.8513) 
2.3360*** 
(0.7360) 
1.5762*** 
(0.2367) 
LGDPj 0.6667*** 
(0.0202) 
0.6028*** 
(0.2002) 
0.8972*** 
(0.0462) 
0.4767*** 
(0.0360) 
LDISTij -1.6161*** 
(0.0257) 
-1.2544 
(0.1780) 
-2.1948*** 
(0.0637) 
-1.7822*** 
(0.0497) 
Country 
Characteristics 
 
LPOPi 1.0760*** 
(0.1497) 
-5.9339 
(6.3833) 
-0.6261 
(2.7211) 
1.0825*** 
(0.2575) 
LPOPj 0.2800*** 
(0.0211) 
0.1025*** 
(0.1554) 
0.2280*** 
(0.0496) 
0.5089*** 
(0.0384) 
LAREAi - - - - 
ERij -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
OP 0.0068*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0795 
(0.0878) 
0.0092*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0010 
(0.0026) 
COLij -0.4005*** 
(0.1100) 
-0.0534 
(0.7786) 
-0.0518 
(0.2383) 
-0.9025*** 
(0.1973) 
COMCOLij 0.5224*** 
(0.0614) 
0.7929 
(0.4899) 
1.0052*** 
(0.1407) 
0.1983* 
(0.1150) 
LANGij 0.8925*** 
(0.0653) 
0.6744 
(0.5285) 
1.0043*** 
(0.1531) 
0.7463*** 
(0.1330) 
GFC -0.2455*** 
(0.0767) 
-1.9638 
(2.2763) 
-0.6634** 
(0.2745) 
-0.6773*** 
(0.1514) 
IGOVi 0.1304*** 
(0.0711) 
-3.0038 
(3.0840) 
0.0269 
(0.4567) 
1.3841*** 
(0.3761) 
IGOVj 0.3266*** 
(0.0302) 
0.1761 
(0.2724) 
0.2784*** 
(0.0685) 
0.5509*** 
(0.0508) 
C -35.2212*** 
(2.0868) 
209.9134* 
(233.6558) 
-42.8602 
(39.0923) 
-39.675*** 
(3.0831) 
 
N 8,960 2,800 2,240 3,920 
F  737.16*** 18,278.66*** 158,792.75*** 328,829.06*** 
R2 within 0.5532 - 0.5825 0.4573 
Source: UN-Comtrade, WDI-World Bank, CEPII, Polity IV, calculated. * significant at 
α=10%, ** significant at α=5%, *** significant at α=1% 
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Tabel 6 Effect of Democracy on Export in MENA Region Classified by Periode) 
 Variable 
LEXij / Coefficient (Standard of Error) 
Total 1988-1994 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 
Democracy   
IDEMi 0,0378 
(0,0454) 
1,3532 
(0,8350) 
-0,9523** 
(0,4280) 
0,6255 
(0,6953) 
-0,3592*** 
(0,0990) 
IDEMj 0,0340*** 
(0,0041) 
0,0129 
(0,0134) 
0,0105 
(0,0111) 
0,0293*** 
(0,0096) 
0,0577*** 
(0,0067) 
Gravity    
LGDPi 1,0034*** 
(0,1251) 
1,9531 
(1,3158) 
3,1629*** 
(1,0405) 
2,2740 
(2,3352) 
0,2516 
(0,5187) 
LGDPj 0,6667*** 
(0,0202) 
0,7435*** 
(0,0511) 
0,6363*** 
(0,0423) 
0,6897*** 
(0,0474) 
0,5916*** 
(0,0501) 
LDISTij -1,6161*** 
(0,0257) 
-1,8004*** 
(0,0715) 
-1,5608*** 
(0,0568) 
-1,5584*** 
(0,0530) 
-1,5546*** 
(0,0512) 
Country 
Characteristics 
  
LPOPi 1,0760*** 
(0,1497) 
-3,4091 
(4,4498) 
1,8281 
(1,5461) 
-1,5777 
(1,1467) 
-0,1724 
(0,6434) 
LPOPj 0,2800*** 
(0,0211) 
0,2595*** 
(0,0540) 
0,3286*** 
(0,0448) 
0,3029*** 
(0,0484) 
0,3252*** 
(0,0508) 
LAREAi - - - - - 
ERij -0,0000*** 
(0,0000) 
0,0001 
(0,0001) 
0,0001* 
(0,0001) 
0,0000 
(0,0000) 
-0,0000*** 
(0,0000) 
OP 0,0068*** 
(0,0014) 
-0,0674* 
(0,0404) 
0,0011 
(0,0101) 
0,0038 
(0,0127) 
0,0078*** 
(0,0020) 
COLij -0,4005*** 
(0,1100) 
-0,6221** 
(0,3022) 
-0,2380 
(0,2454) 
-0,4122* 
(0,2277) 
-0,3296 
(0,2129) 
COMCOLij 0,5224*** 
(0,0614) 
0,6100*** 
(0,1826) 
0,5467*** 
(0,1373) 
0,4313*** 
(0,1286) 
0,4290*** 
(0,1209) 
LANGij 0,8925*** 
(0,0653) 
0,4306** 
(0,1730) 
0,7836*** 
(0,1496) 
0,9933*** 
(0,1391) 
1,1751*** 
(0,1252) 
GFC -0,2455*** 
(0,0767) 
- - - - 
IGOVi 0,1304*** 
(0,0711) 
3,6378 
(2,8659) 
-0,3010 
(0,3609) 
-0,8540** 
(0,4232) 
-0,7338*** 
(0,1683) 
IGOVj 0,3266*** 
(0,0302) 
0,4654*** 
(0,0816) 
0,5234*** 
(0,0675) 
0,2606*** 
(0,0756) 
0,3034*** 
(0,0672) 
C -35,2212*** 
(2,0868) 
21,4141 
(45,7212) 
-106,4905*** 
(39,1453) 
-22,9794 
(38,8376) 
2,4772 
(9,4227) 
  
N 8.960 2.240 2.240 2.240 2.240 
F  737,16*** 102.829,13*
** 
171.739,29*** 227.334,95*** 271.173,29**
* 
R2 within 0,5532 0,2352 0,3165 0,3781 0,4253 
     Source: UN-Comtrade, WDI-World Bank, CEPII, Polity IV, calculated. * significant at 
α=10%, ** significant at α=5%, *** significant at α=1% 
 
